Security Implications of OPC, OLE, DCOM, and RPC in Control Systems by United States. Department of Energy.
The INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory 
operated by Battelle Energy Alliance 
INL/EXT-05-01005
Security Implications of 
OPC, OLE, DCOM, and 
RPC in Control Systems 
Bri Rolston 
January 2006 
INL/EXT-05-01005
Security Implications of OPC, OLE, DCOM, and RPC in 
Control Systems 
Bri Rolston 
January 2006 
US-CERT Control Systems Security Center 
 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 
Prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Under DOE Idaho Operations Office 
Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517
Control Systems Security Center 
Security Implications of OPC, OLE, DCOM, and RPC 
in Control Systems 
INL/EXT-05-01005, Rev. 0 
January 2006 
iEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
OPC is a collection of software programming standards and interfaces used in the process 
control industry. It is intended to provide open connectivity and vendor equipment 
interoperability. The use of OPC technology simplifies the development of control systems that 
integrate components from multiple vendors and support multiple control protocols. OPC-
compliant products are available from most control system vendors, and are widely used in the 
process control industry. 
OPC was originally known as OLE for Process Control; the first standards for OPC were 
based on underlying services in the Microsoft Windows computing environment. These 
underlying services (OLE [Object Linking and Embedding], DCOM [Distributed Component 
Object Model], and RPC [Remote Procedure Call]) have been the source of many severe security 
vulnerabilities. It is not feasible to automatically apply vendor patches and service packs to 
mitigate these vulnerabilities in a control systems environment. Control systems using the 
original OPC data access technology can thus inherit the vulnerabilities associated with these 
services.
Current OPC standardization efforts are moving away from the original focus on Microsoft 
protocols, with a distinct trend toward web-based protocols that are independent of any particular 
operating system. However, the installed base of OPC equipment consists mainly of legacy 
implementations of the OLE for Process Control protocols. 

iii
CONTENTS
1. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DO WE CARE?..............1 
2. OPC IN THE CONTROL SYSTEMS MARKET...............................................................2 
3. POTENTIAL FOR VULNERABILITIES IN OPC ............................................................3 
3.1 VULNERABILITIES IN UNDERLYING SERVICES..........................................3 
3.2 ISSUES SPECIFIC TO OPC...................................................................................4 
4. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................5

vACRONYMS
API Application Programming Interface 
COM Component Object Model 
DCS Distributed Control System 
DCOM Distributed COM 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
OLE Object Linking and Embedding 
OPC OLE for Process Control 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
RPC Remote Procedure Call 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

1SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OPC, OLE, DCOM, AND RPC IN 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The purpose of this white paper is to describe the use of OPC, OLE (Object Linking and 
Embedding), DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model), and RPC (Remote Procedure Call) 
technologies in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and process control 
systems, and examine the implications of their use from a computer security perspective.  
OPC is a collection of standards and interfaces that are specific to process control, 
intended to provide open connectivity and vendor equipment interoperability. To quote the OPC 
Foundation:
OPC technology can eliminate expensive custom interfaces and drivers 
traditionally required for moving information easily around the enterprise. It 
promotes interoperability, including amongst different computing solutions and 
platforms both horizontally and vertically in the enterprise. It therefore cuts 
costs, speeds development and promotes increased operating efficiency.a
Current OPC standardization efforts are moving away from the original focus on Microsoft 
protocols, with a distinct trend toward web-based protocols that are independent of any particular 
operating system. Most currently installed OPC equipment remains based on technologies 
specific to the Microsoft Windows environment. This paper will focus on those technologies and 
protocols.
1. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DO WE 
CARE?
OPC was originally known as OLE for Process Control, as the first OPC standards were 
based on Microsoft’s OLE technology. For the purposes of this paper, the history of this 
technology begins with the Component Object Model (COM). This was Microsoft’s approach to 
distributed object technology—implementing object-oriented interfaces across different 
processes or different computers. COM is a client-server technology that provides a set of 
interfaces allowing clients and servers to communicate within the same computer. 
DCOM is COM distributed across different computers. That is, a client program object can 
request services from server program objects on other computers in a network. COM and DCOM 
were originally Microsoft-specific technologies. The analogous or competing technology in the 
UNIX world is CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture). DCOM 
implementations are also available for major UNIX platforms. 
a. http://www.opcfoundation.org
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computers. RPC includes capabilities for Microsoft message queueing (MSMQ) and 
asynchronous communications. 
COM and DCOM are the underlying protocols normally used to implement OLE. OLE is a 
Microsoft technology for compound documents. A compound document is something like a 
display desktop that can contain visual and information objects of all kinds: text, calendars, 
animations, sound, motion video, 3-D, continually updated news, controls, and so forth. Each 
desktop object is an independent program entity that can interact with a user and also 
communicate with other objects on the desktop.
b
 For a simple example, consider a Microsoft 
Word document that contains an embedded Excel spreadsheet object. Through the use of OLE, 
the user can edit the Excel spreadsheet without leaving Microsoft Word: spreadsheet commands 
are passed through an OLE interface to an Excel OLE automation server. If instead of a Word 
document, a programmer wanted to write a custom program that included an Excel spreadsheet 
embedded in the user interface, the programmer simply uses the standard OLE interfaces 
provided by Excel. 
The utility of OLE for control system development is apparent. Conceptually, the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) display is a compound document that contains individual display 
objects for specific Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), 
etc. These end devices are represented by COM server objects that know the specifics of how to 
communicate with the end device. By embedding these objects in the display and programming 
to their standard Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), parameter display information can 
easily be obtained, control actions can be passed from the HMI to the end devices, endpoint 
alarms can be received, etc., yet the developer does not need to write specific interfaces to each 
and every type of device (and protocol) on the system. Thus, a SCADA system HMI can easily 
communicate with a wide variety of devices from different manufacturers. Further, the use of 
OLE interfaces is extremely common and well-supported in the world of Microsoft application 
developers. It is easy to implement OLE automation using standardized tools such as Visual 
Basic and Visual C++.
2. OPC IN THE CONTROL SYSTEMS MARKET 
The OPC Foundation (http://www.opcfoundation.org) is an industry organization 
dedicated to ensuring interoperability in automation by creating and maintaining open 
specifications that standardize the communication of acquired process data, alarm and event 
records, historical data, and batch data to multi-vendor enterprise systems and between 
production devices. Production devices include sensors, instruments, PLCs, RTUs, Distributed 
Control Systems (DCS), HMIs, historians, trending subsystems, alarm subsystems, and more as 
used in the process industry, in manufacturing, and in acquiring and transporting oil, gas, and 
minerals. 
b. This description is taken from http://searchwin2000.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid1_gci214126,00.html
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and other control devices to HMIs and other display clients. The OPC Foundation has since 
developed specifications for handling alarm and event data, access to data historian functions, 
server-to-server protocols, etc. There is work in progress to develop specifications for web 
services, Extensible Markup Language (XML), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), and 
others. These latter efforts reflect the trend to web-based architectures that are less dependent on 
a specific operating system environment. 
As of October 2005, the OPC Foundation had more than 360 member companies. 
According to a survey article in Control Engineering magazine,
c
 53% of HMI system 
installations use OPC for communications. All of the major HMI vendors include support for 
OPC protocols. In addition to Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) equipment vendors, 
there are third-party companies in the business of providing OPC interfaces. The largest third-
party developer, MatrikonOPC (http://www.matrikonopc.com), has more than 500 specific OPC 
interface products. 
3. POTENTIAL FOR VULNERABILITIES IN OPC 
3.1 VULNERABILITIES IN UNDERLYING SERVICES 
As discussed earlier, the original OPC data access standards are founded on base 
capabilities provided by OLE, COM and DCOM, and RPC services. These services are 
commonly used features in a Microsoft Windows enterprise environment. As such, they are also 
common targets for security attacks. Table 1 lists some of the more severe vulnerabilities 
involving RPC and DCOM services.  
Table 1. Selected RPC and DCOM vulnerabilities. 
Published Vulnerability Description 
CVE-2002-2077 DCOM information leak in Windows 2000 pre-SP3; 
remote attacker can obtain sensitive information. 
CVE-2003-0352 A RPC DCOM buffer overflow; remote attacker can 
execute arbitrary code (exploited by the Blaster and 
Nachi worms). 
CVE-2003-0528 A RPCSS DCOM buffer overflow; remote attacker can 
execute arbitrary code. 
CVE-2003-0605 Remote DoS leading to local privilege escalation. 
Windows 2000 SP3 and SP4. Patched in MS03-039. 
CVE-2003-0715 A RPCSS DCOM buffer overflow; remote attacker can 
execute arbitrary code. 
c. http://www.manufacturing.net/ctl/article/CA6255302
4Published Vulnerability Description 
CVE-2003-0807 Buffer overflow in COM internet services and RPC over 
HTTP proxy. Patched in MS04-012. 
CVE-2003-0813 RPC DCOM denial of service. Patched in MS04-012. 
Problems with MS03-039. 
CVE-2004-0116 RPCSS DCOM activation; denial of service. Patched in 
MS04-012.
CVE-2004-0124 The DCOM RPC interface for Microsoft Windows NT 
4.0, 2000, XP, and Server 2003 allows remote attackers 
to cause network communications via an "alter context" 
call that contains additional data; also known as the 
"Object Identity Vulnerability." High severity; remotely 
exploitable. Patched in MS04-012.
d
These RPC and DCOM vulnerabilities are not specific to control system networks. 
However, a control system network that is using OPC is vulnerable to these threats. Control 
system network administrators must mitigate these threats by keeping current with patches and 
service packs, or applying other security measures. 
From the perspective of a knowledgeable attacker, knowing that OPC is being used 
implies that these underlying services are also present. The attacker could try known attack 
methods against these services to gain system access. 
3.2 ISSUES SPECIFIC TO OPC 
For control systems networks, it is typically not feasible to blindly apply vendor service 
packs and patches. Asset owners must carefully test these to ensure that they do not interfere 
with specific capabilities that are unique to control systems, as distinct from conventional IT 
networks. Due to the difficulty of testing and deploying vendor service packs and patches, and 
the time required for these activities, control systems are therefore more likely to have unpatched 
vulnerabilities for which there are known exploits. 
One example is Windows XP Service Pack 2. If this service pack is installed with default 
settings, OPC over DCOM will cease to work.
e
 Using the default settings, Windows Firewall 
blocks traffic created by OPC callbacks (where the OPC client becomes a DCOM server, and 
vice versa). The recommended fix is to add all OPC client and server machines to the exception 
list, or perhaps turn off the firewall entirely (if appropriate within the network). The firewall 
must allow incoming Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 135, and some COM security 
d. http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-012.mspx
e. http://www.opcfoundation.org/Archive/1adcdca3-f6bb-48ca-8cc7-37403baf6b58/White%20Papers/OPC, 
%20DCOM%20and%20Security.pdf
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assigned services to port numbers other than the typical defaults; these port numbers might also 
be blocked by the default firewall settings in Service Pack 2.
Since OPC client applications are inherently distributed applications, they also involve 
security and authentication mechanisms. They rely on standard Windows RPC mechanisms for 
security controls. Access Control Lists are used for OLE components in the same manner as for 
files and directories. As of 1998, “…most OPC client vendors… implemented browsing for 
remote OPC Servers by using the Registry API’s that support access to a remote machine’s 
registry.”
f
 Allowing remote registry access gives potential attackers an additional means of entry, 
particularly if the access control lists are not configured for maximum security. There are efforts 
underway to resolve this security issue by developing alternate browsing mechanisms. 
Similarly, opcenum.exe, a commonly used tool for browsing available OPC servers on the 
network, requires that anonymous login be enabled. Some other OPC clients and servers also 
have this requirement. The use of anonymous login accounts presents an obvious security 
concern.
4. CONCLUSION
Control systems using OPC technology inherit the vulnerabilities associated with the 
underlying RPC and DCOM services in Microsoft Windows environments. These services have 
been a source of many severe vulnerabilities; exploits against unpatched systems are widely 
available. The system configuration required for OPC usage precludes the automatic application 
of security patches and service packs for the operating system. Asset owners should remain 
aware of the vulnerabilities presented by unpatched systems using these services, and ensure that 
other appropriate security controls are in place when conventional patches cannot be applied.
f. http://www.opcfoundation.org/Archive/1adcdca3-f6bb-48ca-8cc7-37403baf6b58/White%20Papers/OPC, 
%20DCOM%20and%20Security.pdf
